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Managing Access Policies

Permissions After approving MCPs, you control who can access them through access rules. Runlayer’s policy system combines fine-grained permissions with ease of use, achieving both accuracy and least privilege by default.

How Access Rules Work

Access rules grant permissions to users, groups, roles, or agent accounts for specific MCP servers. Each rule can include multiple principals of the same type — for example, several users or several groups in one rule. Applies To (Who gets access):
  • User: One or more individual employees by email/ID
  • Group: One or more teams synced from your SSO (Engineering, Marketing, etc.)
  • Role: One or more job functions or custom roles
  • Agent Account: One or more machine-to-machine identities (see Agent Accounts)
  • Attributes: Match users by identity attributes (e.g., department, job title)
  • Everyone: Wildcard principal that matches all subjects, including users and agent accounts (typically used in global deny policies)
Access Scope (What they can access):
  • Entire Server: Full access to all tools in the MCP
  • Specific Tools & Resources: Fine-grained selection of individual tools
Conditions (Advanced - Optional):
  • Add runtime rules based on tool arguments (e.g., restrict SQL queries to specific tables)
  • Enforce network restrictions (e.g., corporate IP ranges only)
  • Validate OAuth session properties (e.g., require verified accounts)
  • Block specific MCP clients
This design ensures you can easily grant appropriate access while maintaining security through least privilege.

Policy Types

Runlayer supports two types of policies:

Server-Level Policies

Manage access to specific MCP servers. Navigate to Build → [Server Name] → Policies tab.
  • Scope: One or more specific servers
  • Action: Allow or Deny
  • Use for: Granting access, fine-grained tool restrictions
  • Example: Allow Finance group to use database query tools

Global Policies

Organization-wide restrictions that apply everywhere. Navigate to Admin → Policies.
  • Scope: All servers, tools, and resources (*)
  • Action: Deny only
  • Use for: IP blocks, client restrictions, compliance requirements
  • Example: Block all access from outside corporate network
Use global policies for organization-wide security controls, and server-level policies for granting and managing access to specific resources.

Creating Access Rules

1

Navigate to MCP Policies

Go to the MCP you want to grant access to → Policies tab
2

Click 'New Access Rule'

Opens the access rule creation dialog
3

Select Who Gets Access

Choose a principal type (User, Group, Role, Agent Account, or Attributes), then select one or more from the dropdown. A single rule can include multiple principals of the same type.
4

Define Access Scope

Choose between:
  • Entire Server: Grant access to all tools (faster, simpler)
  • Specific Tools & Resources: Select individual tools (more secure, granular)
5

Add Rule

Click “Add Rule” to save - takes effect immediately

Access Rule Examples

Team-Wide Server Access

Scenario: Give engineering and devops teams access to the GitHub MCP
Applies To: Group "Engineering", Group "DevOps"
Access Scope: Entire Server
Result: All members of both groups can use every tool in the GitHub MCP
When to use:
  • Multiple teams need comprehensive access
  • Server tools are all appropriate for the groups
  • Simplicity is preferred over granularity

Fine-Grained Tool Access

Scenario: Give finance analysts read-only access to the Database MCP
Applies To: Group "Finance"
Access Scope: Specific Tools & Resources
Selected Tools:
  - list_tables
  - query_database
  - read_schema
Result: Finance can only query and read, not modify data
When to use:
  • Sensitive MCPs require least privilege
  • Only specific tools are needed
  • Different roles need different capabilities

Annotation-Based Access (Read-Only Tools)

Scenario: Give data analysts access to all tools, but only allow read-only ones at invocation time
Applies To: Group "Data Analysts"
Access Scope: Entire Server
Conditions:
  - meta.tool.annotations.readOnlyHint EQUALS true
Result: Data Analysts can see all tools, but can only invoke
        tools annotated as read-only
When to use:
  • Restrict access based on tool capabilities (read-only, destructive, etc.)
  • Enforce safety boundaries at invocation time
  • Works across any server with annotated tools

Individual User Access

Scenario: Give a contractor temporary access to specific Slack tools
Applies To: User "contractor@company.com"
Access Scope: Specific Tools & Resources
Selected Tools:
  - list_channels
  - read_messages
  - search_messages
Result: Contractor can read but not post or manage Slack
When to use:
  • Individual exceptions needed
  • Temporary access for specific users
  • Contractors or external collaborators
  • Testing new MCPs with a single user first

Conditional Access by Tool Arguments

Scenario: Allow finance team to query only sales and finance tables
Applies To: Group "Finance"
Access Scope: Specific Tools
Selected Tools: query_sql
Conditions:
  - payload.table BEGINS_WITH ["sales_", "finance_"]
Result: Finance can query sales_* and finance_* tables only
When to use:
  • Database access needs table-level restrictions
  • File systems need path-based access control
  • APIs need parameter validation
  • Sensitive data requires fine-grained control

Global Policy: Block External IPs

Scenario: Require all users to access MCPs from corporate network
Location: Admin → Policies (Global)
Applies To: Everyone
Action: Deny
Scope: All servers, tools, resources (*)
Conditions:
  - meta.request.ip NOT_IN_IP_RANGE ["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12"]
Result: Any access from outside corporate IPs is blocked
When to use:
  • Compliance requires network-based access control
  • Remote work must use VPN
  • Sensitive data needs IP restrictions
  • Organization-wide security policy

Restrict Gmail to Internal Recipients Only

Scenario: Prevent outgoing Gmail messages to external recipients, allowing only emails sent to your internal domain (e.g., @runlayer.com)
Location: MCP -> Connectors → Gmail → Policies tab
Applies To: Group "Everyone" (or specific teams)
Action: Deny
Access Scope: Specific Tools
Selected Tools:
  - send_email
  - send_draft
Conditions:
  - payload.to NOT_ENDS_WITH "@runlayer.com"
Result: Users can only send emails to @runlayer.com addresses; 
        attempts to email external domains are blocked
You can extend this policy to also check payload.cc and payload.bcc fields using additional condition rules to ensure internal-only communication across all recipient types.
When to use:
  • Prevent data exfiltration via email in AI agent workflows
  • Enforce internal-only communication for sandbox or development environments
  • Provide guardrails for agents with Gmail access
  • Meet compliance requirements for regulated data
  • Test new AI workflows safely before allowing external communication

Block Tools That Accept Sensitive Parameters

Scenario: Prevent any tool that requires a password parameter from being invoked
Location: Admin → Policies (Global)
Applies To: Everyone
Action: Deny
Scope: All servers, tools, resources (*)
Conditions:
  - meta.tool.input_schema.required LIST_CONTAINS password
Result: Any tool whose JSON Schema lists "password" as a
        required field is blocked at invocation time
When to use:
  • Prevent credential-handling tools from running without approval
  • Block tools with dangerous parameter shapes (e.g., sql, command)
  • Works with any meta.tool.input_schema.* subfield (e.g., type, required)
input_schema is the tool’s JSON Schema object. Use dot-path subfields like meta.tool.input_schema.required with the list_contains operator, or meta.tool.input_schema.type with equals.

Block Destructive Tools Organization-Wide

Scenario: Prevent all users from invoking tools that may delete or overwrite data
Location: Admin → Policies (Global)
Applies To: Everyone
Action: Deny
Scope: All servers, tools, resources (*)
Conditions:
  - meta.tool.annotations.destructiveHint EQUALS true
Result: Any tool marked as destructive is blocked at invocation time
When to use:
  • Enforce safety boundaries across the organization
  • Protect production data from accidental deletion
  • Compliance requirements for data preservation
  • Gradual rollout (start with deny-all, grant exceptions)

Dynamic Value References ($meta.* / $payload.*)

Condition values can reference runtime context dynamically by prefixing with $. This enables policies that compare one context field against another — for example, comparing a tool argument against values recorded earlier in the session. Supported prefixes:
  • $payload.<field> — Resolves to the current tool call’s argument value
  • $meta.<path> — Resolves to any meta.* context field
Behavior when a reference cannot be resolved:
  • If the referenced path doesn’t exist (e.g., the tool argument isn’t present), the rule fails (does not match) — even for negated operators like not_equals or list_not_contains. This prevents accidental allows when data is missing.
Example:
Condition rule:
  field: meta.session.payload_values_used.repo
  operator: list_not_contains
  value: $payload.repo
This rule matches when the current repo argument has not been used earlier in the session.

Session Payload Tracking

Runlayer can track which distinct tool argument values an agent uses during a session. Combined with deny policies and dynamic value references, this enables session isolation — once an agent accesses a resource (e.g., a specific repository), it cannot access different ones for the rest of the session. How it works:
  1. A deny policy references $payload.<field> in its value — this tells Runlayer to track that field
  2. On each allowed tool call, the actual argument value is recorded in the session (Redis-backed, set-based)
  3. On subsequent calls, meta.session.payload_values_used.<field> contains all previously-used distinct values
  4. The deny policy evaluates against that list to block divergent values
Only fields referenced by active policies are tracked — there is no overhead for unreferenced arguments. Tracking is set-based (distinct values only, no counts or ordering).

Repository Isolation (Need-to-Know)

Scenario: Once an agent accesses a repository, block all other repositories for the rest of the session. Prevents context leakage across repos in shared agent sessions.
Location: MCP → [GitHub Server] → Policies tab
Applies To: Agent Account "Code Agent" (or Everyone)
Action: Deny
Access Scope: Entire Server
Conditions (all rules in one group — AND logic):
  - meta.session.payload_values_used.repo LIST_NOT_CONTAINS $payload.repo
  - meta.session.payload_values_used.repo LIST_REGEX ".+"
Result: After the first tool call with a "repo" argument, any call 
        with a different "repo" value is denied
How the two rules work together:
RulePurpose
list_not_contains $payload.repoCurrent repo is not in the set of previously-used repos
list_regex ".+"At least one repo has been used before (prevents blocking the very first call)
Both rules must match (AND) for the deny to activate. On the first call, the second rule fails (no previous values), so the call is allowed and the repo is recorded. On subsequent calls with the same repo, the first rule fails (it IS in the list), so the deny doesn’t activate. On calls with a different repo, both rules match and the call is denied.
Edit the field name (repo) to match your MCP server’s argument name — common alternatives include repository, project, or owner/repo. The same pattern works for any field: database, account_id, workspace, etc.

Available Operators

Conditions use operators in snake_case. All operators are listed below:
CategoryOperatorDescription
EqualityequalsExact match
not_equalsDoes not match
StringcontainsValue contains substring
not_containsValue does not contain substring
begins_withValue starts with prefix
not_begins_withValue does not start with prefix
ends_withValue ends with suffix
not_ends_withValue does not end with suffix
RegexregexMatches a regular expression
not_regexDoes not match a regular expression
IP Rangeip_rangeIP is within CIDR range(s)
not_ip_rangeIP is outside CIDR range(s)
Listlist_equalsDeep equality between lists (order-sensitive)
list_not_equalsLists are not deeply equal
list_containsList contains value; if rule value is a list, all values must be present (subset check)
list_not_containsList does not contain value; if rule value is a list, none of its values can be present
list_regexList field entry matches regex
list_not_regexNo list entry matches regex
list_ip_rangeList IP entry is within CIDR range(s)
list_not_ip_rangeNo list IP entry is within CIDR range(s)
Negated operators (not_* and list_not_*) evaluate to true when the field is missing or unavailable, following the principle that an absent value cannot satisfy the positive condition.

Condition Value Matching

When writing conditions, keep these matching rules in mind:
BehaviorDetails
String comparisons are case-sensitiveequals, contains, begins_with, ends_with, and regex all match exact casing. "Cursor" does not match "cursor".
Boolean values are case-insensitiveFields like meta.tool.annotations.readOnlyHint or meta.subject.is_active accept true, True, or TRUE interchangeably.
Tool and resource names are case-sensitiveScope entries (tools, resources) must match the exact name from the MCP server.
IP ranges use CIDR notationip_range / not_ip_range operators accept single or comma-separated CIDRs (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12).

Best Practices

When in doubt, grant access to specific tools first. You can always expand later if needed.Why?
  • Easier to add permissions than remove them
  • Users won’t miss tools they didn’t know existed
  • Reduces attack surface if credentials are compromised
Create access rules for groups whenever possible, even if the group only has one member initially.Why?
  • Scales better as teams grow
  • Easier to audit (who’s in “Engineering” vs 50 individual rules)
  • Syncs automatically with SSO changes
  • Simplifies onboarding/offboarding
Runlayer automatically syncs groups from your identity provider (IDP) via SCIM, mirroring your org structure.What this means:
  • Groups from Okta, Azure AD, or Google Workspace sync automatically
  • New employees added to groups get access immediately
  • Employees removed from groups lose access instantly
  • No manual group management needed
Best practice:
  • Create access rules using your existing IDP groups
  • Engineering, Sales, Finance groups work out of the box
  • Changes in your IDP reflect in Runlayer instantly
Review access rules quarterly:
  • Who has access to sensitive MCPs?
  • Are there users who no longer need access?
  • Can we tighten tool permissions?
Why?
  • Prevents scope creep
  • Maintains least privilege
  • Required for compliance
Add conditions when scope alone isn’t enough:Good use cases:
  • Restrict database queries to specific tables
  • Limit file access to certain paths
  • Validate API parameters
  • Enforce network restrictions
Available context:
  • payload.* - Tool arguments (e.g., payload.table, payload.path)
  • meta.request.ip - Client IP address
  • meta.request.user_agent - HTTP User-Agent header for client identification
  • meta.request.method - HTTP request method
  • meta.request.path - HTTP request path
  • meta.subject.type - Subject type (user or agent)
  • meta.subject.id - Subject ID
  • meta.subject.email - Subject email address
  • meta.subject.name - Subject display name
  • meta.subject.roles - Assigned roles
  • meta.subject.groups - Group memberships
  • meta.subject.organization_id - Organization ID
  • meta.subject.attributes - Identity attributes (department, job title, etc.)
  • meta.subject.is_active - Whether the subject is active
  • meta.user.* - Alias for meta.subject.* (backward compatibility)
  • meta.oauth.provider - OAuth identity provider
  • meta.oauth.scopes - OAuth scopes granted
  • meta.oauth.token_expires_at - OAuth token expiry timestamp
  • meta.server.id - Server ID
  • meta.server.name - Server name
  • meta.server.deployment_mode - Server deployment mode
  • meta.server.auth_type - Server authentication type
  • meta.server.url - Server URL
  • meta.tool.id - Tool ID
  • meta.tool.name - Tool name being invoked
  • meta.tool.description - Tool description
  • meta.tool.annotations.readOnlyHint - Whether the tool is read-only
  • meta.tool.annotations.destructiveHint - Whether the tool is destructive
  • meta.tool.annotations.idempotentHint - Whether the tool is idempotent
  • meta.tool.annotations.openWorldHint - Whether the tool interacts with external entities
  • meta.tool.input_schema - Tool input JSON schema
  • meta.session.servers_used - Server IDs accessed earlier in this session (list)
  • meta.session.tools_used - Tools called earlier in this session (list, format: server_id:tool:tool_name)
  • meta.session.scopes_used - Read/write scopes accessed earlier (list, format: server_id:scope:read|write)
  • meta.session.payload_values_used.<key> - Distinct tool argument values used earlier in session (list, per argument name)
  • meta.session.external_session_id - External session identifier
  • meta.resource.uri - Resource URI
  • meta.resource.name - Resource name
Start simple: Begin without conditions, add them only when needed for sensitive data or compliance.
Apply security controls across all resources:Common use cases:
  • Block access from outside corporate network
  • Restrict access to approved clients only (e.g., allow only Cursor)
  • Require OAuth verification
  • Enforce compliance requirements
Remember:
  • Global policies can only DENY (not allow)
  • They apply to all servers, tools, and resources
  • Manage them in Admin → Policies
  • Test with small groups before applying to everyone
Combine with server policies: Use global denies for security, server-level allows for access grants.

Admin Handbook

Complete policy management guide

Security

Monitor security alerts

Approvals

Review MCP requests

Security Best Practices

Security guidelines